We develop a market microstructure model in which trade amongst heterogeneous consumers and producers is intermediated by middlemen and oligopolistic market makers (gatekeepers). Market makers post bid and ask prices. All parties can freely view the posted bid and ask prices. Middlemen stand ready to trade at bid and ask prices they quote on a private basis to consumers or producers who identify these intermediaries via a costly search process. We model competition between market makers as a twostage game: capacity setting in the …rst stage and bid and ask prices in the second stage. We characterize the equilibrium market structure of intermediaries and the distribution of prices in equilibrium. Our main focus is the e¤ect on prices that emerges following a change in the market structure of intermediation, speci…cally through the entry or exit of a market maker. Exit of a market maker initially results in a shift of trade from market makers as a whole to middlemen resulting in an increase in price dispersion (variability). Following transition to the new market structure with fewer market makers, price dispersion returns to its pre-exit level when total trade passing through the remaining market makers is roughly equal to the preexit level. We present an empirical study of price dispersion in the North American natural gas market for the period before and following the exit of Enron in late 2001. The empirical evidence supports the main propositions of our theory: price dispersion jumped 4-fold immediately following Enron' s exit but returned to its pre-exit level within roughly 2 months following the exit date.
Introduction
The intermediation of trade in real goods is a signi…cant feature of many markets. Typically, intermediation is facilitated by middlemen and/or market makers. Market makers facilitate trade by posting publicly observable bid and ask prices. On the other hand middlemen stand ready to trade at bid and ask prices they personally quote on a private basis to consumers or producers who identify them. The implications of such trading structures when market makers are present have however received surprisingly little attention, notable and important exceptions being Rust and Hall (2003) who extend the price-setting middlemen model of Spulber (1996 Spulber ( , 1999 by introducing a monoplistic market maker, and Baye and Morgan (2001) who study a monopolist information gatekeeper. 1 Some markets however, such as the North American market for natural gas, have exhibited the joint existance of both middlemen as well as multiple market makers. Such an economic setting requires an alternative formulation of the model in order to gain insight into the functioning of such markets. The model developed in this study features both oligopolistic market makers and competitive middlemen thus extending the work of Spulber (1996 Spulber ( , 1999 and Rust and Hall (2003) , allowing us to capture a facet of intermediated markets for real goods that has not heretofore been investigated.
The study of oligopolistic competition amongst market makers is limited. Rust and Hall (2003) suggest approaching the problem within a Bertrand-style price competition setting. In an economy in which multiple market makers survive in equilibrium the Bertrand formulation of the problem results in zero pro…t and market power vanishes. While interesting in its own right, such an approach does not permit the implications of market power amongst oligopolists to be directly investigated. We alternatively formulate the economic setting to preserve the existance of market power amongst market makers.
We study a market for a homogenous product in which market maker capacity is constrained. We formulate a two-stage game in which market makers compete in capacity choice at the …rst stage and in bid and ask prices in the second stage. Similar to the well known argument made by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , we show that the outcome of our two-stage game in which optimal bid and ask prices are established is equivalent to the Cournot outcome. Rust and Hall (2003) and Spulber (1996) focus primarily on the market equilibrium as a result of the pricing policies of a market maker (Rust and Hall), or competitive middlemen (Spulber) , and the comparison of such market equilibria with the Walrasian equilibrium of the model. While we also characterize the market equilibrium of our model, we focus on the dispersion of prices in the market, and in particular on how this dispersion changes when the market structure of intermediation changes. We consider three market structure situations: 1) the market with middlemen but no market makers, 2) the market with middlemen and oligopolistic market makers, and, 3) the market during and after a transition phase in which a market maker exits.
In our model middlemen are heterogenous in the transaction costs they incur when intermediating trade. A higher transaction cost increases the optimal ask price, but reduces the optimal bid price o¤ered by a middleman.
In a market with middlemen but no market makers, the spread between the highest and lowest ask (bid) price equals the spread between the most e¢-cient middleman' s ask (bid) price and the highest (lowest) reservation price of all consumers (producers). In the market with middlemen and oligopolistic market makers, all market makers publicly post an unique ask (bid) price, which serves as the high (low) bound for the ask (bid) prices of middlemen.
The consumer (producer) who has a reservation price lower (higher) than the price posted by the market makers transacts through middlemen. In this setting the spread between the highest and lowest ask (bid) price equals the spread between the most e¢cient middleman' s ask (bid) price and the ask (bid) price posted by market makers. As market makers enter or exit the market, the ask and bid prices posted by market makers will change, and therefore the dispersion of ask and bid prices will also change. We show that the exit of a market maker initially results in a shift of trade from market makers as a whole to middlemen resulting in an increase in price dispersion.
Following transition to the new market structure with fewer market makers, price dispersion returns to its pre-exit level if total trade passing through the remaining market makers is roughly equal to the pre-exit level.
Our model is close in spirit to recent work by Morgan (2001, 2004 ) who also concern themselves with the dispersion of prices. We however reach di¤erent conclusions about the source of such dispersion. An important di¤erence between the two studies is the underlying institutional setting. Baye and Morgan are concerned with a setting in which the market maker faces no capacity constraints. Our model on the other hand directly incorporates capacity constraints. The model of Morgan (2001, 2004 ) predicts price dispersion arises because …rms which list prices on a monopoly gatekeeper' s screen make their prices strategically unpredictable -to avoid all-out price competition, while …rms which do not list prices on the gatekeeper' s screen all charge the same price. The gatekeeper (market maker) thereby becomes the source of price dispersion in the Baye and Morgan model. Our theory alternatively predicts that all prices charged by oligopoly market makers are the same, while prices charged by middlemen with heterogenous transaction costs are spread over a range. Market makers'services reduce price dispersion in our model. Our work also di¤ers from theirs in that we study how price dispersion changes with a change in market structure which we also empirically test. To the best of our knowledge there have been no empirical studies that examine how price dispersion varies with the structure of market makers.
The exit of Enron in late 2001, the then largest market maker in the North American natural gas market, provides a unique opportunity for us to examine the e¤ect of this change in market structure on the dispersion of market prices. Enron was a major intermediary handling roughly 20% of the wholesale natural gas volume sold in the domestic United States by the top 10 marketers during the period leading up to December 2001. We present an empirical study of price dispersion in the North American natural gas market for the period before and following the exit of Enron in late 2001. The empirical evidence supports the main propositions of our theory: Natural gas spot price dispersion jumped 4-fold immediately following Enron' s exit at the end of 2001 but returned to its pre-exit level within roughly 2 months following the exit date.
We begin by studying a market with middlemen but no market maker.
We then introduce a …xed number of oligopolistic market makers in Section 3. In both sections we highlight the dispersion of prices in equilibrium. In Section 4 we turn to the e¤ect on the dispersion of prices when a market maker exits. In Section 5 we present an empirical study of the behavior of North American natural gas spot prices before and after the exit of Enron in late 2001. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Market Settings
The initial market setting consists of a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, producers, and middlemen who trade a homogenous good. We follow Spulber (1996 Spulber ( , 1999 and Rust and Hall (2003) and assume the cost incurred by any middleman in conducting a transaction is less than the cost that would be incurred by any consumer or producer if they were forced to search for other consumers or producers with whom to trade. We investigate the equilibrium of this market setting and characterize the distribution of equilibrium prices. We then introduce a …nite set of market makers and show how the bid and ask prices that prevail in equilibrium are in ‡uenced by the presence of the two types of intermediaries. The primary characteristic di¤erentiating middlemen from market makers is the manner in which the prices at which each are willing to transact are revealed to consumers and producers. Market makers post the price at which they are willing to buy (bid price) and the price at which they are willing to sell (ask price) for all consumers and producers to freely see at no cost to the consumer or producer. In contrast the bid and ask prices of middlemen are private information. The only way a consumer or producer can discover the bid and ask prices of a middleman is through a costly search process. 
Consumers and Producers
The population of consumers is represented by a uniform distribution of willingness-to-pay levels on the interval [v; v] similar to Spulber (1996 Spulber ( , 1999 and Rust and Hall (2003) . We assume any particular consumer searches randomly across middlemen. Each middleman therefore faces an equal probability of making a trade. Consumers know the equilibrium distribution of ask prices o¤ered by middlemen F(p) but not the particular middleman associated with each price. A consumer' s optimal search rule is to compare the net value of current consumption with the returns to search. The consumer purchases the good if and only if the ask price p is less than or equal to his reservation value. Consumers remain in the market for a random length of time before permanently exiting where¸2 (0; 1) is the probability that a consumer exits the market in period t: In each period a fraction¸of the population of consumers exits the market and is replaced by an equal fraction of new consumers.
Total expected discounted demand is the expected discounted value of the stream of demands in all future periods by the initial population of consumers as well as the stream of demands from each succeeding generation of new consumers entering the market (Spulber, 1996; Rust and Hall, 2003) .
Let p be the ask price of a particular middleman and D(p) be the share of total expected discounted demand serviced by any middleman, then
where N is the number of middlemen, a 1 > 0 and a 2 > 0, and each active middleman receives an equal share of searchers. Each producer searches randomly across middlemen and sells the good to a middleman if and only if the bid price o¤ered, w, is greater than or equal to the producer' s reservation value. Producers also exit the market each period with probability¸2 (0; 1) and are replaced accordingly with new producers.
By reasoning similar to the articulation of demand, a middleman' s expected discounted supply function is therefore
where a 3 < 0 and a 4 > 0: The highest reservation value of the population of consumers is equal to v = a 1 =a 2 ; and the lowest reservation value of the population of producers is equal to c = ¡a 3 =a 4 : The equilibrium demand of consumers who participate in the market is given by a 2 (v ¡ p) = N D(p), which is equal to the equilibrium supply of producers who participate in the market, a 4 (w¡c) = NS(w):
Middlemen
Middlemen incur a transaction cost k per unit of the good purchased from any producer. The population of potentially active middlemen is represented by a uniform distribution of transaction costs k on the interval [k; k]: A middleman' s present discounted value of trading pro…ts is given by 3
Each middleman, indexed by k, solves the following problem
The …rst order conditions associated with problem (4) yield optimal ask and bid prices, p and w respectively, for a middleman with transaction cost k
where ½ is the time discount factor. In contrast our formulation is more general requiring only that the coe¢cients obey the indicated sign conventions. 3 See Spulber (1999, Ch. 6).
where
A higher transaction cost increases the optimal ask price, but reduces the optimal bid price. These bid and ask prices also equate supply and demand in every period as has been shown by Spulber (1999) . Substitution of the optimal bid and ask prices into the pro…t function gives
The value for k which solves ¼(p; w; k) = 0 gives the highest transaction cost that any middleman can incur while both serving the market and surviving.
Denote this value as k ¤ where
Any middleman with transaction cost k > k ¤ will not enter the market. If k ¤ < k; the market is inactive since no middleman has a transaction cost less than k ¤ and hence none could survive. We are interested in active markets and so assume k ¤ > k. We will also assume that k is su¢ ciently large so that k ¤ < k: Thus, the number of middlemen operating in equilibrium is represented by N = k ¤ ¡ k: 4 Letting k in equation (5) equal …rst k and then 4 Following standard convention we have normalized the sum of the number of middlemen to equal 1. Thus, k ¤ ¡ k represents the fraction of all middlemen with transactions costs in the interval k ¤ to k. 
It can be easily veri…ed that
That is, the maximum ask price is equal to the maximum price consumers are willing to pay and the minimum bid price is equal to the minimum opportunity cost of producers. We restrict our attention to stationary pricing policies on the equilibrium path. Thus, D(p) and S(w) in the above represent stationary demand and supply functions in each period, and the pair of equilibrium ask and bid prices derived above represent steady-state equilibrium prices in each period.
The Market with Oligopolistic Market Makers
We now extend Rust and Hall' s (2003) model by introducing oligopolistic market makers. We begin by assuming there are m market makers. Market maker j(j = 1; ¢¢ ¢; m) posts publicly observable ask and bid prices (p j ; w j ).
There is no cost to a consumer or producer to view these prices. 5 We analyze a setting in which both price and quantity decisions by market makers are considered. Competition amongst market makers is modeled as a two-stage game in which market makers compete in quantity bought in the …rst stage, and compete in bid and ask prices in the second stage. The quantity purchased acts as a capacity constraint for price competition. 6 
Two-Stage Market Makers'Competition
Each consumer will search for the lowest ask price p among all posted ask prices, and buys the good if p is less than or equal to the consumer' s reservation value. Each producer will search for the highest bid price w among all posted bid prices, and sell the good if w is greater than or equal to the producer' s reservation value. Therefore, market makers as a whole face total market demand, X = a 1 ¡ a 2 p; and total market supply, Y = a 3 + a 4 w: The inverse market demand and supply functions are therefore
Let y j and x j denote the quantity bought and sold by market maker j;
respectively. Market maker j incurs a per unit cost r j for each transac-tion processed. We order market makers so that r j is nondecreasing in j:
Therefore, market maker 1 is the most e¢cient in terms of having the lowest processing cost while market maker m is the least e¢cient. Assuming e¢-cient rationing, market maker j will face a residual-demand function against other market makers. No market maker will set bid and ask prices such that purchases exceed sales, since otherwise the market marker could increase its pro…t by reducing purchases in the …rst stage and correspondingly lowering the bid price. Similar to the well known argument made by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), we will …rst construct the Cournot equilibrium in quantity competition, and then show that the outcome of our two-stage game in which optimal bid and ask prices are established is equivalent to the Cournot outcome.
Let q j = x j = y j be the quantity that market maker j trades. Market maker j' s pro…t is
. Recall that we are working with expected discounted demand and supply and that we restrict our attention to stationary pricing policies on the equilibrium path. The …rst order condition for pro…t maximization by a market maker is
which gives market maker j' s optimal reaction function
Solving the m equations in (13) gives the Cournot equilibrium quantity that the market maker trades
It is easy to see
We assume the processing cost r j for any market maker is su¢ciently small so that q ¤ m > 0. In other words all market makers are active in the market. Alll market makers will transact at their respective optimal Cournot capacities and charge the same bid and ask prices in the two-stage game.
Proposition 1 Suppose market makers compete in quantity bought at the …rst stage and compete in ask and bid prices at the second stage. In a pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, all market makers buy their optimal Cournot quantities in the …rst stage, asking the same price
; and bidding the same price
Each market maker j sells up to its Cournot capacity q ¤ j .
Proof. We …rst show that all market makers charge the same bid and ask prices in equilibrium. Suppose this were not true and suppose we let market maker j bid w j < e w where e w = maxfw i (i = 1; ¢ ¢¢; j ¡ 1; j + 1; m)g; then market maker i with the highest bid could reduce its bid price and maintain its Cournot capacity; if i did not act to reduce its bid the result would be that i would buy the entire market supply at e w: In this case j buys nothing at w j ; whereas it could build up positive capacity by bidding e w + " for small " and earn a positive pro…t. Similarly, let market maker j o¤er the ask price p j > e p where e p = minfp i (i = 1; ¢ ¢¢; j ¡ 1; j + 1; m)g:
Then market maker i with the lowest ask price could increase its ask price and sell up to its equilibrium capacity. Conversely e p is i' s monopoly price and i will supply the entire market demand at e p: In this case j sells nothing at p j ; whereas it could earn a positive pro…t by undercutting to e p ¡ ":
Given capacity q j (j = 1; ¢ ¢¢; M); we next show that market makers buy and sell up to capacity. Suppose that w 1 = ¢ ¢¢= w m = w < w (²) j P m j= 1 qj : Then the bid price is too low, in that at least some market maker j cannot realize its capacity. If w 1 = ¢ ¢¢= w m = w > w (²) j P m j =1 q j ; all market makers strictly ration their suppliers. By reducing its price by ", j would still be able to build up capacity and would earn a larger pro…t. Suppose
Then the ask price is too high, so that at least some market maker j cannot sell up to its capacity: q j < q j :
By charging p ¡ "; market maker j gets all of the market and can sell up to q j : For su¢ciently small "; we must have (p ¡ ") q j > pq j ; so that j would gain from undercutting. If p 1 = ¢ ¢¢= p m = p < p (²) j P m j =1 qj ; all market makers strictly ration their customers. By raising its price by ", j would still be able to sell its capacity and would earn a larger pro…t. Now we show q j = q ¤ j (j = 1; ¢¢ ¢; M) is the Nash equilibrium in the …rst stage. Suppose that market maker i(i 6 = j) buys q ¤ i : The pro…t of market maker j; if it buys q j 6 = q ¤ j ; equals the LHS of the following equation
using the result that pro…t measured at Cournot capacity q ¤ j exceeds pro…t measured at q j when q j 6 = q ¤ j : Q.E.D. Using equation (15), the total output traded by market makers is given
Substituting equations (15) and (16) back into the pro…t function (12), we have
The least e¢cient market maker m survives in the market if
So the transaction cost of the least e¢ cient surviving market maker is lower than that of the marginal middleman in a market without market makers. Market makers'ask and bid prices are given by
The consumer who has a reservation price higher than p m and the producer who has a reservation price lower than w m are served by market makers.
Note that p m <
= w:
The market maker in our model can alternatively be viewed as an information gatekeeper similar to the gatekeeper studied by Baye and Morgan 
Middlemen
The consumer who has a reservation price lower than p m and the producer who has a reservation price higher than w m transact through mid- 7 Later we examine the behavior of spot prices in the North American Natural Gas market. That market was characterized by the presence of market makers as well as middlemen during the period of time we study, as is also true at the current time.
dlemen rather than through a market maker. Each consumer randomly searches across middlemen until a middleman is identi…ed who o¤ers an ask price lower than the consumer' s reservation value. Similarly, each producer radomly searches across middlemen until a middleman is identi…ed who offers a bid price greater than the producer' s reservation value. The residual demand and supply faced by middlemen equals
where Q m equals the total demand (supply) serviced by market makers. The shares of total demand and supply for any single middleman when market makers exist equal
The above equations indicate that the highest reservation value of the consumers served by middlemen is b 1 =a 2 = p m ; while the lowest reservation value of the consumer served by middlemen is ¡b 3 =a 4 = w m : Similar to the analysis in Section 3.2, the optimal ask and bid prices for middlemen are
Solving for ¼(p^; w^; k) = 0 gives the highest transaction cost a middleman can bear and also survive, The fraction of consumers and producers served by middlemen is
Dispersion of Ask and Bid Prices
Using equations (6), (8), (10), (23), (24) and (25), we have
Total consumer demand served by market makers and middlemen is Q = Q m + Q^. Using equations (19) and (26), we have
consumer (or producer) is served by middlemen with probability ® and is served by market makers with probability
Let F (p j p m ) denote the distribution function of ask prices when market
) is represented by the kinked line p^AB in Figure 1 .
The lower and upper bound of the distribution are p^and p m respectively:
The consumer whose reservation value is greater than or equal to p^and less than p m is served by middlemen and F (p j p m ) = ® 
The E¤ect of a Change in Market Structure on Price Dispersion
We now consider a change in market structure represented by a change in the number of market makers serving the market. We study the case in which a single market maker j exits from the market. Immediately after the exit of the market maker consumers and producers who would have otherwise traded with that party are forced to search for a new counterparty for their trades. We de…ne a transition period after the exit of market maker j during which the remaining market makers are unable to adjust their capacities.
More middlemen will enter into the market and the consumers and producers who would have transacted with market maker j must implement a search across the middlemen operating in the market to identify trading partners.
Consumers and producers who had already planned to transact with the remaining m¡1 market makers and N^middlemen do not deviate from their original optimal choices (prices and quantities). Following the transition period the displaced consumers and producers settle into trading relations with the remaining m ¡ 1 market makers if their reservation values are respectively higher than the ask price and lower than the bid price o¤ered by those market makers, otherwise they are served by middlemen.
Price Dispersion during the Transition from m to m ¡ 1 Market Makers
We assume that consumers who would have been served by the exiting market maker j have reservation values that are evenly spread from p m to p:
Therefore, during the transition period these consumers, represented by their share of total output traded through market makers q ¤ j Q m will be served by middlemen. Using the same argument as in Section 4, we conclude that the highest price asked by middlemen is p: Thus, the di¤erence between the lowest and the highest ask prices in the market becomes
imilarly, the share of total trades of producers handled by market makers At this stage it will be bene…cial to articulate the connection between the dispersion of bid and ask prices and the dispersion of the prices at which transactions occur. As equation (11) indicates, the ask price is determined by the inverse demand curve while the bid price is determined by the inverse supply curve at any equilibrium quantity Q: Thus, the ask price is always greater than the bid price. Let ask prices be spread between p 1 and p 2 (p 2 > p 1 ) and bid prices be spread between w 1 and w 2 (w 2 > w 1 ). Therefore, because transactions occur at either an ask or a bid price, transaction prices will be spread between w 1 and p 2 , which are the lower bound of bid prices and the upper bound of ask prices. The following proposition follows. 
Price Dispersion Following the Transition Period
The new structure of the market following the transition period is characterized by m ¡ 1 market makers. Rewriting equation (16), we have
After market maker j' s exit, Q m becomes Q m¡1 : With m¡1 market makers, the market becomes less competitive. Using equations (30) and (18), we can
show that Q m¡1 < Q m ; which implies that p m¡1 > p m and w m¡1 < w m .
Immediately after a market maker exits from the market, the amount of consumer and producer trade volume served by all market makers decreases; the mean of ask prices increases and the mean of bid prices decreases. The di¤erences between the lowest and the highest bid prices and the lowest and highest ask prices increase. Note that the change in price dispersion is determined by the change in Q m ; the total trade volume served by market makers. We o¤er the following corollary to proposition 4.
Corollary 5 If a change in market structure does not signi…cantly a¤ect the total trade volume served by all market makers, the prediction is neither will it signi…cantly a¤ect price dispersion. Therefore, if for instance the total trade volume serviced by market makers following the transition period recovers to the pre-exit level, then we would expect that price dispersion would also return to its pre-exit level.
The North American Natural Gas Market
The North American natural gas industry is composed of a distinct chain of businesses and exhibits little vertical integration. The parties involved include producers, gatherers, processors, pipelines, marketers (both market makers and middlemen as we have de…ned them), distributors and end users.
Marketers act as intermediaries. There is an active market for physical gas as well as an active market for gas futures contracts traded on the New York Mercantile. Table 1 Table 1 . While Figure 3 is very suggestive, we now turn to formal statistical tests of the null hypothesis that dispersion was equal during the pre-exit, transition and post-transition subperiods.
Statistical Tests for Shifts in Price Dispersion
We divide the total sample period into three subperiods: Sample period 
where Rg t is the relative price range, T t takes the value 1 if day t is a Tuesday and 0 otherwise, and corresponding dummies are identi…ed for W We conclude from the statistical tests that the behavior of natural gas spot prices during the period prior to Enron' s exit from the natural gas market through and after the market' s transition to a new con…guration of intermediaries is consistent with the predictions of the theory developed in this study.
Conclusions
Neoclassical economics leaves open the question of how actual markets attain equilibrium prices. The theory of intermediation and the microstructure of markets developed by Spulber (1996 Spulber ( , 1999 In our model oligopolistic market makers charge the same ask (bid) price which imposes an upper (lower) bound on the ask (bid) prices of middlemen. we make herein, which we leave for future research. 
